TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

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Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today with you, and a great honor to talk about a crucial issue in our entire foreign policy, the way ahead on Iraq.

Let me begin by addressing the Subcommittee's query about the relationship between the President's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the Decisions announced following the June Camp David Iraq Principals Meeting and the President's visit to Baghdad. I believe that a review of this will not only respond to your specific query, but help answer other issues you have raised in your letter to Secretary Rice.

The November 2005 National Strategy laid out in comprehensive detail the President's program for victory at the strategic level. While the document provided detail on current activities, strategies, and programs, its primary focus is on establishing our core goals, laying out a path to achieve them, and highlighting basic tenets on which we align our daily policy.

The document begins by describing Victory in Iraq, as a process that will come in stages, with an end state of an Iraq "peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism."

To achieve that end state, the document lays out our policy along three core tracks: the Political, the Security, and the Economic, describing in detail the assumptions behind each track, the actions that are being pursued and why we feel these will help Iraq reach its goals, the progress being made, and the challenges that remain.

In addition, the National Strategy highlights the following basic tenets, every bit as true today as eight months ago:

- Our strategy is working, but victory will take time
- Progress in each of the above tracks reinforces the other; thus no one track alone will secure success
- Success in Iraq is central to winning the war on terror
- Iraq is increasingly in the lead in our joint efforts to defeat terrorists and providing security; 2006 is a year of transition, as Iraqis take on greater and greater responsibilities in the military and civilian realms;
- But this process cannot be based on any timeline; rather, it must be conditions-based

On June 13, on the conclusion of a meeting of NSC Principals on Iraq, including the President's trip to Baghdad and discussions with PM Maliki and other Iraqi leaders, the White House released a Fact Sheet on these Camp David Meetings.

The Camp David Meetings took place in response to a number of operational developments on the ground since the November release of the National Strategy. These include such positive events as the formation of a broad, inclusive government based upon record voter turnout in December, rapid standup of Iraqi forces, achievements in infrastructure despite insurgent efforts, including an increase in both electrical generation above last year, and oil exports reaching levels close to the IMF 2006 target, as well as the killing of Al Qaida in Iraq leader Zaqawi. The Meetings also came in the wake of less positive developments, including sustained high levels of insurgent attacks, and a marked increase in sectarian violence and strife following the attack on the Samarra Golden Mosque in February.

Camp David provided the President and his senior advisors an opportunity to take stock of the progress in carrying out the National Strategy. They were also able to contemplate the newly-articulated priorities and programs of the Iraqi government and consider how the United States might best support them. In this context, the group took a number of operational decisions, which are documented in the Camp David Meetings Fact Sheet.

The decisions do not represent any deviation, modification or replacement of the National Strategy, but rather tactical and operational steps to carry out that Strategy, refined by the developments on the ground and by the Prime Minister's program. Indeed, the National Strategy outlines in a comprehensive and unclassified form, our *strategy* for victory in Iraq. The Camp David Fact Sheet discusses our present-day *tactics and actions* — as updated following the stand-up of a new unity government — to carry out our strategy and reach our strategic goals. There is no inconsistency between the two documents; they are complementary and part and parcel of a comprehensive plan for achieving success.

On the Political and Security Tracks, Camp David reviewed on-going operations in Ramadi and Baghdad, the standup of Iraqi security forces, and efforts to assist the newlynamed Ministers of Defense and Interior in building key functions in their headquarters.

The Meetings also focused on building civilian capacity, approving US plans to support a rule of law initiative with the Iraqis, with special emphasis on increasing the number of judges, enhancing security, providing technical assistance and building prison capacity. The Meetings also welcomed the Prime Minister's initiative on bringing armed groups under government control, and in this regard the President directed MNF-I Commander GEN Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad to coordinate with their Iraqi counterparts and provincial authorities to ensure that Iraqi forces have a military edge. Finally, in support of the Prime Minister's reconciliation effort, the Camp David Meetings described US work with NGOs and other institutions to bring Iraqi leaders together with those of other countries, and welcomed initiatives by other international bodies to provide forums to bring Iraqis together. Such initiatives for example include an Arab League Meeting scheduled for this summer in Baghdad.



On the Economic Track, the Prime Minister discussed his policy of national revitalization. The President in turn has asked the Treasury Department to deploy additional professionals to assist Iraq in developing a public finance system. The President also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to travel to Iraq to meet with his counterparts to determine additional actions the US can take to help return Iraq to its former status as a breadbasket for the region.

Similarly, in support of Iraq's oil and electrical sectors, The President directed the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce to travel to Iraq to see how they can assist the revitalization program. All three of these visits are set for the near future.

In support of the National Strategy's core assumption that "Iraq needs and can receive the support of the region and the international community to solidify its successes," the President welcomed Prime Minister Maliki's approach to international organizations to take the lead with his government in developing a compact between the international community and the Iraqi government and people. The President designated Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt and Department of State Counselor Philip Zelikow to lead the US effort in support of this initiative.

As I believe is clear, these various actions represent important steps forward in carrying out the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. I can brief in more detail on the specific accomplishments since June 13, but will here note that the Prime Minister subsequently announced his reconciliation initiative, formally requested UN support for the International Compact, and received a gratifying positive response from UN Secretary General Annan.

Among the positions taken by the Administration in the course of the Camp David meetings was a strong endorsement of the importance of the oil sector for the unity of Iraq. The President addressed this in his remarks to the press on June 12. The President and Prime Minister Maliki discussed the need for a review of past de-baathification policy, and reviewed other aspects of the impending reconciliation initiative, including the ways in which we and the international community might assist.

In sum, we see the work plan emerging from the Camp David Meetings as a critical roadmap to organize our assistance to the Iraqi Government, and to appeal to the international community, in the coming months. We are heartened by the rapid, decisive decisions on all of the tracks taken by the Maliki government, we are impressed by the courage shown by all Iraqis, beginning with their political leaders and their security forces, and we are ever more committed to seeing this endeavor, so critical to the security of all of us, to a victorious conclusion.